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STEVEN J. SIMMONSt
Although much has been written about the Federal Com-
munication Commission's fairness doctrine, the legal literature
largely has ignored the Commission's articulation of that doc-
trine in its personal attack and political editorial rules.' Under
these rules, an individual or group that is attacked during a
discussion of a controversial issue of public importance or a can-
didate who is not favored in a broadcast licensee's political
editorial is provided an opportunity to respond over the air. In
the following pages, an attempt will be made to examine these
rules and the resulting case law in detail. This Article will begin
with a brief look at the fairness doctrine and then proceed to
trace the evolution of the personal attack and political editorial
rules. Critical examinations of each of the rules in their current
operational settings will lead to the conclusion that the personal
attack rules should be repealed, but that, with some modifica-
tions, the political editorial rules, at least for the time being,
should be retained.
I. THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE
The FCC's personal attack and political editorial rules are
considered subcategories of the Commission's fairness doctrine.
Under that doctrine all television and radio licensees2 are re-
* This Article will appear subsequently as a chapter in a book by the author enti-
tled THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE AND THE MEDIA, to be published by the University of
California Press. Copyright 3 1977 by Steven J. Simmons. All rights reserved.
I Assistant Professor, Program in Social Ecology, University of California, Irvine.
B.A. 1968, Cornell University; J.D. 1972, Harvard University. Member, California Bar.
1 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.123 (AM radio), .300 (FM radio), .598 (noncommercial educa-
tional FM radio), .679 (TV station), 76.209 ("origination cablecasting" over cable TV
systems) (1976). The exceptions are articles focusing on first amendment issues raised
by the rules. See, e.g., Comment, FCC's Formal Rules Concerning Personal Attacks and Politi-
cal Editorials Contravene the First Amendment, 44 NOTRE DAME LAW. 447 (1969).
2 Like the personal attack and political editorial rules, the fairness doctrine also is
applicable to cable television system operators who originate programming under their
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quired to do two things: First, they must devote a reasonable
amount of their programming to controversial issues of public
importance. Second, they must air contrasting sides of those
issues-that is, be "fair."'
3
Declining to issue specific rules with respect to these two
general requirements, the FCC has not told licensees precisely
how to determine what issue is raised in a broadcast, whether an
issue is controversial or of public importance, what constitutes a
reasonable opportunity to respond to viewpoints already aired,
or what is a reasonable amount of programming on important,
controversial issues. Rather, any guidelines that exist must be
gleaned from agency and court decisions and occasional Com-
mission policy statements.
4
The key to understanding how the fairness doctrine is ap-
plied is the Commission's standard for judging licensees' actions
under the doctrine: any fairness decision by a licensee will be
upheld if it is reasonable and made in good faith. Both the
Commission and the courts "have stressed the wide degree of
discretion available under the fairness doctrine" and have stated
"ad injinitcni ad nausean, that the key to the doctrine is no mysti-
cal formula but rather the exercise of reasonable standards by
the licensee."5 The doctrine "cannot be applied with scientific
and mathematical certainty.",
Although the fairness doctrine has been severely criticized,7
the FCC does not take its requirements lightly. The Commission
has stated that it regards "strict adherence to the fairness doc-
trine as the single most important requirement of operation in
exclusive control. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.205, .209 (1976). See generally Simmons, The Fairness
Doctrine and Cable TV, 11 HARV. J. LEGIs. 629 (1974).
3 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377 (1969) ("The broadcaster
must give adequate coverage to public issues . . . and coverage must be fair in that it
accurately reflects the opposing views.").
'The Commission has issued four key policy statements: 39 Fed. Reg. 32,288
(1974) ("Broadcast Procedure Manual, Revised Edition"); 39 Fed. Reg. 26,372 (1974)
("Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standards") [hereinafter cited as Fairness
Report]; 29 Fed. Reg. 10,416 (1964) ("Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the
Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance") [hereinafter cited as Fairness
Primer]; Report of the Commission on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C.
1246 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Editorializing Report].
I Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. FCC, 460 F.2d 891, 903 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 843 (1972).
6 Id. at 900.
7 See, e.g., Rosenfeld, The Jurisprudence of Fairness: Freedom Through Regulation in the
Marketplace of Ideas, 44 FORDHAm L. REV. 877 (1976); Comment, Power in the Marketplace
of Ideas: The Fairness Doctrine and the First Amendment, 52 TEx. L. REV. 727 (1974); Com-
ment, The FCC's Fairness Doctrine in Operation, 20 BUFFALO L. REV. 663 (1971).
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the public interest-the "sine qua non" for grant of a renewal of
license."' The importance the Commission attaches to the fair-
ness doctrine is a function of the doctrine's major purpose: keep-
ing the American people informed on vital issues essential to a
healthy democracy. As the Commission stated in its 1949
Editorializing Report, it is the "right of the public to be informed
. . . which is the foundation stone of the American system of
broadcasting."' Inextricably linked with the goal of public in-
formation are the objectives of preventing powerful broadcasters
from using a scarce resource-the airwaves-to control the data
received by the American public and of providing general access
for the views of various groups and individuals. 1"
Like the general fairness requirements, the personal attack
and political editorial rules are geared, at least theoretically, to
keeping the public informed of contrasting views on important
public issues. Thus, a person who was attacked in a broadcast is
not entitled to air time to respond unless the attack occurred
during discussion of a controversial issue of public importance."
When a response is presented, the public is given the opportu-
nity to hear that a person involved in a public controversy may
not be as the attacker depicted him. Similarly, the candidate who
was not endorsed or who was specifically opposed in an editorial
gets his chance to present a different view on how the public
should vote. In providing these reply opportunities, the FCC not
only attempts to keep the public informed, but also tries to pre-
vent any licensee from using the power of his scarce airwave
frequency to unduly influence the public and allows some access
for those who have been harmed by a broadcast to respond to
Committee for the Fair Broadcasting of Controversial Issues, 25 F.C.C.2d 283,
292 (1970).
9 Editorializing Report, supra note 4, at 1249. The Commission added: "It is ax-
iomatic that one of the most vital questions of mass communication in a democracy is
the development of an informed public opinion through the public dissemination of
news and ideas concerning the vital public issues of the day." Id. More recently the
Commission declared: "Full information is the theoretical underpinning of the
broadcaster's two [fairness doctrine] duties." Handling of Public Issues Under the Fair-
ness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, Reconsid-
eration of the Fairness Report, 58 F.C.C.2d 691, 693 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Recon-
sideration, Fairness Report].
"'See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Robert H.
Scott, [1946] 3 RAD. REC. (P & F) 259, 263-64; Editorializing Report, supra note 4, at
1248-50; Note, The Ma'yflower Doctrine Scuttled, 59 YALE L.J. 759 (1950). No particular
individual, however, is entitled to access. Choice of spokesmen is made by the licensee.
" See text accompanying note 39 infra.
FCC RULES RECONSIDERED
it. 12 In the Commission's view, the personal attack and political
editorial rules "serve to effectuate important aspects of the well
established Fairness Doctrine .... 13
11. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULES
A. Pre-1967 Case Law
Unlike the general fairness doctrine, the origins of which
can be traced as far back as the Federal Radio Commission's
decision in Great Lakes Broadcasting4 in 1929, specific FCC in-
volvement with personal attacks and political editorials had a
later start. In the first definitive Commission report on the fair-
12 Although sharing many of the same objectives, the personal attack and personal
editorial rules differ from the general fairness doctrine in several important ways. At
the most obvious level, specific rules have been issued for personal attacks and political
editorials, but not for the more general fairness doctrine situation. Unlike the general
fairness situations, the licensee has no control over the reply speaker, must follow
specific steps in notifying the reply speaker, has less control over the reply speaker's
response format, and must pay a forfeiture if he is in violation of the rules. See text
accompanying notes 14-81 infra. The licensee is also, of course, not obligated to air
personal attacks in the first place, as he is to present controversial issues of public
importance under the first part of the fairness doctrine.
13 32 Fed. Reg. 10,303 (1967) ("Personal Attacks; Political Editorials"). In pursuit of
its fairness objectives and in order to make the public benefits of the rules more acces-
sible to the citizenry, the Commission provided a format for filing a complaint with the
FCC in the wake of what a complainant considers to be a personal attack:
If you file a complaint with the Commission, a copy should be sent to the
station. The complaint should contain specific information concerning the fol-
lowing matters: (I) The name of the station or network involved; (2) the words
or statements broadcast; (3) the date and time the broadcast was made; (4) the
basis for your view that the words broadcast constitute an attack upon the
honesty, character, integrity, or like personal qualities of you or your group;
(5) the basis for your view that the personal attack was broadcast during the
presentation of views on a controversial issue of public importance; (6) the
basis for your view that the matter discussed was a controversial issue of public
importance, either nationally or in the station's local area, at the time of the
broadcast; and (7) whether the station within 1 week of the alleged attack; (i)
Notified you or your group of the broadcast; (ii) transmitted a script, tape, or
accurate summary of the broadcast if a script or tape was not available; and
(iii) offered a reasonable opportunity to respond over the station's facilities.
39 Fed. Reg. 32,290 (1974).
14 3 F.R.C. 33 (1929). For a history of the early development of the fairness doc-
trine, see Simmons, Fairness Doctrine: The Early History, 29 FED. Cors. B.J. 207 (1976).
Although early, published Federal Radio Commission (FRC) or FCC cases focusing on
personal attacks or political editorials are scarce, in at least one case a radio
broadcaster's license was not renewed partially because of attacks made on judges, re-
ligious groups, a labor organization, and the Board of Health. Trinity Methodist
Church, South v. FRC, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 685 (1932), 288
U.S. 599 (1933). In Mayflower Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333, 339-40 (1941), the
FCC chastised a licensee for airing editorials in favor of political candidates and seem-
ingly ordered licensees not to editorialize or advocate their personal views. The latter
policy was reversed in the Editorializing Report, supra note 4, at 1252-53.
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ness doctrine, issued in 1949, the FCC stated: "[E]lementary con-
siderations of fairness may dictate that time be allocated to a
person or group which has been specifically attacked over the
station, where otherwise no such obligation would exist." 15
The personal attack and political editorial case law, however,
did not begin to evolve seriously until the early 1960's. In Clayton
W. Mapoles,16 a group of state and county officials from Florida
complained that Mr. Mapoles, licensee of radio station WEBY,
had used the station to attack them personally. They alleged that
station broadcasts had accused them of political tricks, dictatorial
tactics, utilizing their offices for personal gain, and otherwise
had denigrated their personal character and integrity. Mapoles,
they charged, was doing all this primarily to promote his own
candidacy for the state senate.
The Commission, after a series of on-the-spot interviews,
found that the licensee indeed had attacked the petitioners. It
concluded: "Where, as here, the attacks are of a highly personal
nature which impugn the character and honesty of named indi-
viduals, the licensee has an affirmative duty to take all appro-
priate steps to see to it that the persons attacked are afforded
the fullest opportunity to respond."'17 Finding, however, that
Mapoles had offered the attacked individuals, in on-the-air an-
nouncements, an opportunity to respond over the station's
facilities and had not used the station to promote his own candi-
dacy for office, the Commission denied the petition for non-
renewal of Mapoles' license.
In a concurring opinion, FCC Chairman Newton Minow
further delineated the kinds of "appropriate steps" that should
be taken by licensees when personal attacks occur. "In many, if
not most, cases," on-the-air statements offering response time to
those personally attacked may not be enough. Rather, licensees
may have to notify those to be attacked in advance of the broad-
cast, provide them with tapes or a verbatim text of the broadcast,
or both.
1 8
In Billings Broadcasting Co.," 9 decided the same year as
Mapoles, the General Manager of the National Rural Electric
Cooperative Association complained that a Montana radio sta-
- Editorializing Report, supra note 4, at 1252.
16 [1962] 23 RAD. REG. (P & F) 586.
17 Id. at 591.
18 Id. at 593 (concurring statement of Chairman Minow).
19 [1962] 23 RAD. REG. (P & F) 951 (1962).
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tion had broadcast at least twenty editorials vilifying him in con-
nection with the Association's position favoring the creation of
Public Utility Districts in the state. He maintained that the
station's offer allowing him to respond in an interview format
was unfair and untimely because he had just arrived in town and
could not prepare adequately. Although the Commission neither
denied renewal of the license nor mandated absolutely the prior
notice requirement advocated by Chairman Minow in Mapoles, it
did state:
[W]here, as here, a station's editorials attack an indi-
vidual by name, the "fairness doctrine" requires that a
copy of the specific editorial or editorials shall be com-
municated to the person attacked either prior to or at
the time of the broadcast of such editorials so that a
reasonable opportunity is afforded that person to
reply. °
In failing to supply copies of the protested editorials, the Mon-
tana station had violated fairness doctrine requirements.
The broadcasts in Mapoles and Billings involved attacks on
officials already elected or appointed to office. Times-Mirror
Broadcasting Co., 21 on the other hand, focused on candidates
seeking office. Two television commentators on KTTV in Los
Angeles had made statements about the candidates and issues in
the 1962 California gubernatorial campaign. In over twenty dif-
ferent broadcasts they had spoken either against incumbent
Governor Brown and the Democratic Party or in favor of chal-
lenger Richard Nixon and the Republicans. Among their broad-
casts were attacks on Brown such as one claiming "he is one of
the greatest ignoramuses on Communism that ever lived or he is
soft on it."'22 Their remarks apparently did not have much effect
on the campaign's outcome; the former Vice President lost in his
home state-ironically, he placed much of the blame on an al-
leged media bias against him. 23 The commentators' statements
did have significance, however, in the development of evolving
personal attack and political editorial case law.
In response to a complaint from the Democrats, the Com-
mission telegrammed KTTV that the station's two broadcasts
2 01 d. at 953.
21 [1962] 24 RAD. REG. (P & F) 404.
22 24 RAD. REG. at 411.
23 N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1962, at 1, col. 7.
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devoted to viewpoints opposed to those previously presented by
the commentators did not adequately fulfill fairness doctrine re-
quirements. KTTV's actions had violated "the right of the public
to a fair presentation of views." 24 The Commission further as-
serted that if a station permits any person other than a candidate
to attack one candidate or support another by direct or indirect
identification, the station must "send a transcript of the perti-
nent continuity on each such program to the appropriate candi-
date immediately and should offer a comparable opportunity for
an appropriate spokesman to answer the broadcast. '25 Respond-
ing to KTTV's objection that requiring such procedures might
deter stations from covering election-period issues, the Commis-
sion sent a followup telegram a week later that exempted news-
casts and news interviews, as well as discussion programs where
contrasting spokesmen aired their views, from the personal at-
tack notification procedures.
26
Licensees were reminded of their personal attack respon-
sibilities in a 1963 public notice2 7 that summarized the three
decisions just discussed. The notice stated that a licensee should
send the text of the pertinent continuity to the attacked party
and include a "specific offer" to use his broadcast facilities for
response. 28 The 1964 Fairness Primer29 also contained a section
devoted to the "Personal Attack Principle ' 30 that similarly di-
gested the pertinent FCC decisions. It also cited the Commis-
sion's response to an inquiry letter sent in 1963 stating that, even
if the attack is made by a party unconnected with the station, a
station must follow personal attack procedures .and that if no
tape or transcript is available, a licensee must send the most
accurate summary possible to the party affected.
31
In a Primer footnote, the FCC made four major points: the
personal attack procedure is applicable only when statements are
24 24 RAD. REG. at 408.
25 Id. No fine was imposed. The FCC apparently was satisfied with KTTV's prom-
ise to follow the Commission's mandate between the telegram date and the election.26 Id. at 406.
27 28 Fed. Reg. 7,692 (1963) ("Stations' Responsibilities Under Fairness Doctrine as
to Controversial Issue Programming").2 1d. In Springfield Television Broadcasting Corp. [1965] 4 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F)
681, 685, the Commission cited the public notice in declaring that a Springfield televi-
sion station's mailing of editorial transcripts to all persons attacked did not fulfill its
fairness obligations, because a specific response offer was not transmitted.
29 Fairness Primer, supra note 4.
3 Id. 10,420-21.
21 Id. (citing letter of September 18, 1963 to Douglas A. Anello).
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made "in connection with a controversial issue of public impor-
tance"; it is concerned only with attacks on a person's or group's
"integrity, character, or honesty or like personal qualities"; it is
not applicable to mere references to people or groups or mere
disagreement about views on an issue; and it is not relevant to
attacks on foreign leaders.3 2
During the same period that the FCC became active in the
personal attack and political editorial area, legislative attention
began to focus on the problem. The intense congressional con-
cern about creating a viable remedial procedure for personal
attacks, especially with respect to political candidates, was re-
flected in this 1963 statement addressed to FCC Chairman Wil-
liam Henry by Senator Pastore, Chairman of the Senate Sub-
committee on Communications:
I think you ought to give the aggrieved party some
immediate remedy. . . .All you have to do is worry
about setting up the mechanism for this person to bring
his side to the public attention before it is too late.
I would hope the Commission would get into this
immediately. 3
Agreeing with Senator Pastore, Chairman Henry, at hearings be-
fore the House and Senate Subcommittees on Communications,
indicated that the Commission was considering issuing specific
rules with respect to personal attacks over the airwaves and
recommended that legislation not be passed in this area.3 4
Nevertheless, it was almost three years before the FCC adopted a
notice of proposed rulemaking to deal with the problem.3 5
32 Id. 10,420.
33 Hearings on S. 251, S. 252, S. 1696, and H.R.J. Res. 247 Before the Subcomm. on
Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1963). Pastore
continued:
[A] small individual, what right of redress does he have? Take a person run-
ning for a school committee in the city of Providence. There is no remunera-
tion for that position. And a local broadcasting station takes it upon itself, in a
very spirited campaign for the school committee, which to the mothers of that
community is just as important as the Presidency of the United States for the
moment-the broadcaster comes along and endorses one candidate against the
other. What protection does that little fellow have, unless you have something
in the law that gives him protection?
Id. 67-68.
31 Id. 97-98; Hearings on Broadcast Editorializing Practices Before the Subcomm. on Com-
munications and Power of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong.,
ist Sess., 89, 90 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Broadcast Editorializing Practices).
:5 31 Fed. Reg. 5,710 (1966) ("Personal Attacks; Political Editorials, Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking").
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B. The 1967 Rules and Amendments
The Commission finally issued specific rules on July 10,
1967.36 The two primary reasons advanced for embodying per-
sonal attack and political editorial procedures in rule form was to
make licensing procedures more precise and clear and to pro-
vide a basis for imposing sanctions in the event of noncom-
pliance.3 7 The rules are stated in three paragraphs:
Personal attacks; political editorials.
(a) When, during the presentation of views on a
controversial issue of public importance, an attack is
made upon the honesty, character, integrity or like per-
sonal qualities of an identified person or group, the
licensee shall, within a reasonable time and in no event
later than 1 week after the attack, transmit to the per-
son or group attacked (1) notification of the date, time
and identification of the broadcast; (2) a script or tape
(or an accurate summary if a script or tape is not avail-
able) of the attack; and (3) an offer of a reasonable
opportunity to respond over the licensee's facilities.
(b) The provisions of paragraph (a) of this section
shall be inapplicable to attacks on foreign groups or
foreign public figures or where personal attacks are
made by legally qualified candidates, their authorized
spokesmen, or those associated with them in the cam-
paign, on other such candidates, their authorized
spokesman, or persons associated with the candidates in
the campaign.
NOTE: In a specific factual situation, the fairness
doctrine may be applicable in this general area of politi-
cal broadcasts. See, section 315(a) of the Act (47 U.S.C.
315(a)); public notice: Applicability of the Fairness Doc-
trine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public
Importance. 29 Fed. Reg. 10415.
(c) Where a licensee, in an editorial, (i) endorses or
3 32 Fed. Reg. 10,305-06 (1967) (codified at 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.123, .300, .598, .679
(1976)).
3 Id. 10,303. The Commission stated that it would be able to impose forfeitures
under 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1970) for willful or repeated violations. 32 Fed. Reg. 10,303
(1967). In testimony before the House Subcommittee on Communications in 1963,
Chairman Henry had stated that rules also would make available cease and desist or-
ders under § 312(b) and (c) and revocation under § 312(a)(4). He suggested that it
might also be appropriate to require licensees to retain records of efforts to air oppos-
ing views. Hearings on Broadcast Editorializing Practices, supra note 34, at 89-90.
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(ii) opposes a legally qualified candidate or candidates,
the licensee shall, within 24 hours after the editorial,
transmit to respectively (i) the other qualified candidate
or candidates for the same office or (ii) the candidate
opposed in the editorial (1) notification of the date and
the time of the editorial; (2) a script or tape of the
editorial; and (3) an offer of a reasonable opportunity
for a candidate or a spokesman of the candidate to re-
spond over the licensee's facilities: Provided, however,
that where such editorials are broadcast within 72 hours
prior to the day of the election, the licensee shall com-
ply with the provisions of this subsection sufficiently far
in advance of the broadcast to enable the candidate or
candidates to have a reasonable opportunity to prepare
a response and to present it in a timely fashion.
38
In the text accompanying the announcement of the new
rules, the Commission emphasized that the personal attack prin-
ciple is part and parcel of the fairness doctrine and that the
attack rules are applicable only when an attack occurs in the
context of the discussion of a controversial issue of public
importance. 39 After brusquely rejecting arguments that the rules
violate broadcasters' first amendment rights, 411 the Commission
stated that a licensee is responsible for what is broadcast over his
facilities and must obey the personal attack rules even if the
attack is made on a network show. 41 The Commission tempered
its warning, however, by noting that the rule would not be used
to sanction those who seek to comply with it in good faith. 42 It
also stressed that personal attacks and political editorials were in
no way prohibited; if such attacks or editorials were presented,
38 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.123, .300, .598, .679 (1976).
39 32 Fed. Reg. 10,303-04 (1967). The Commission also said: "'[The development
of an informed public opinion through the public dissemination of news and ideas
concerning the vital public issues of the day is the keystone of the Fairness Doctrine.' "
Id. 10,303 (quoting Editorializing Report, supra note 4, at 1249). The Commission
stressed that private disputes involving personal attacks were not subject to the rules. Id.
10,304.
4 Id. 10,303.
41 Id. 10,304.
42 Id. The Commission said that sanctions would be applied only when the licensee
does not comply and "there can be no reasonable doubt under the facts that a personal
attack has taken place (e.g., a statement in a controversial issue broadcast that a public
official or other person is an embezzler or a Communist)." Id. Licensees were also ad-
vised promptly to consult the Commission in appropriate cases. Id. n.6. The Commis-
sion left the definition of "reasonable opportunity" to respond up to the licensee's rea-
sonable, good faith judgment. Id. 10,305.
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however, the notification and reply opportunity requirements
must be met.43 The Commission concluded its remarks by point-
ing out that campaign attacks by candidates and their spokesmen
against other candidates had been excluded because they usually
fall within the equal time bailiwick 44 and, in offering a reply to a
licensee political editorial, the licensee could air a candidate's
spokesman instead of the candidate in order to avoid equal time
obligations.
4 5
Some of the procedures outlined in the new rules went
further than the previous case law. For example, the new rules
provided more specific time limits for notification and transmit-
tal of the date and time of the broadcast and a more specific
description of the proper form for an attack text reproduction.
4 6
The Commission also expanded the scope of the persohal attack
principle by failing to exempt from personal attack rules, in
apparent repudiation of one of its previous rulings,47 newscasts,
news interviews, and discussion programs including opposing
speakers. At the same time, the Commission loosened its re-
quirements in some respects. Although earlier cases had indi-
cated that notification of an attacked party should occur prior to
or at the time of the broadcast containing the attack,48 the
Commission did not require such advance or simultaneous
notification in the rules.
49
The news exemptions were reinstituted by two amendments
to the rules that came within a year of the rules' promulgation.
43 Id. 10,303.
44 Id. 10,305; see 47 U.S.C. § 315 (Supp. V 1975).
45 32 Fed. Reg. 10,305 (1967). The Commission stated that, except in extraordinary
circumstances, the candidate's spokesman should be chosen by the candidate. Id. n.9.
The FCC made two other significant points. First, it reaffirmed its ruling in John H.
Norris, I F.C.C.2d 1587 (1965), aff'd sub nom. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367 (1969), that the attacked party had to be given air time even if he could not
pay for it. Second, the Commission noted that if a licensee decides that no personal
attack has occurred, but thinks that there may be some dispute over this conclusion, he
should keep a record of the broadcast for a reasonable time and make it available for
public inspection. 32 Fed. Reg. 10,305 n.7 (1967).
46 "Foreign groups" were also added as an exempt category in addition to the
"foreign leaders" category specified in the Fairness Primer, supra note 4, at 10,420 n.6.
,1 Times-Mirror Broadcasting Co., [1962] 24 RAD. REG. (P & F) 404, 406.
'8 See Billings Broadcasting Co., [1962] 23 RAD. REG. (P & F) 951, 953; Clayton W.
Mapoles, [1962] 23 RAD. REG. (P & F) 586, 593 (concurring statement of Chairman
Minow).
49 The Commission did suggest that the one-week time limit "does not mean that
such a copy should not be sent earlier or indeed, before the attack occurs, particularly
where time is of the essence." 32 Fed. Reg. 10,305 (1967). Such earlier notification,
however, was not required in the text of the rules.
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Less than a month after the rules were issued, the FCC ex-
empted bona fide newscasts and on-the-spot coverage of bona
fide news events from personal attack requirements5 on the
grounds that requiring personal attack procedures for such
programming might be impractical and impede the news func-
tions of licensees. Standard journalistic practices were thought
adequate to assure the broadcast of both sides of newsworthy
personal attacks; in any case, the general fairness doctrine pro-
vided an ultimate safeguard.51 The same considerations also led
the Commission later to exempt bona fide news interviews and
news commentary or analysis contained in any newscast, news
interview, or on-the-spot news coverage after CBS charged that
the personal attack procedures inhibited journalism in these
areas." The FCC added that it generally had not been faced
with personal attack problems in the news categories being ex-
empted and that it was simply tracking the exemptions Congress
had made to the equal time requirements. 53 It reminded licen-
31 32 Fed. Reg. 11,531 (1967) ("Procedures in Event of Personal Attack or Where
Station Editorializes as to Political Candidates").5 1 id. The Commission also noted that personal attacks occurring during on-the-
spot news coverage would be rare. Id.
52 33 Fed. Reg. 5,362 (1968) (codified at 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.123(b), .300(b), .598(b),
.679(b) (1976)):
(b) The provisions of paragraph (a) of this section shall not be applicable
(1) to attacks on foreign groups or foreign public figures; (2) to personal at-
tacks which are made by legally qualified candidates, their authorized spokes-
men, or those associated with them in the campaign, on other such candidates,
their authorized spokesmen, or persons associated with the candidates in the
campaign; and (3) to bona fide newscasts, bona fide news interviews, and on-
the-spot coverage of a bona fide news event (including commentary or analysis
contained in the foregoing programs, but the provisions of paragraph (a) of
this section shall be applicable to editorials of the licensee).
NOTE: The fairness doctrine is applicable to situations coming within (iii),
above, and, in a specific factual situation, may be applicable in the general area
of political broadcasts (ii), above. See, section 315(a) of the Act, 47 U.S.C.
315(a); Public Notice: Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of
Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 29 F.R. 10415. The categories listed
in (iii) are the same as those specified in section 315(a) of the Act.
33 33 Fed. Reg. 5,362 (1968). The Commission refused to exempt licensee editori-
als, noting that there had been instances of failure to comply with the personal attack
rules in the context of such editorials and news documentaries. The Commission distin-
guished its decision from the equal time news documentary exemption, which applies to
incidental appearances by candidates. Id. 5,363; see 47 U.S.C. 315(a)(3) (1970). The
Commission stressed that the fairness doctrine obligation to present contrasting views of
controversial public issues, including relevant personal attacks, still applied to the ex-
empt news programs. 33 Fed. Reg. 5,363 (1968). The Commission also buried in a
footnote a significant exception to the personal attack rules: if the person attacked was
given a fair opportunity to respond, at the time of an initial attack, to the substance of a
later attack, compliance with the rules has been achieved. Id. 5,362 n.l.
1977]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 125:990
sees, however, that the general fairness doctrine still applied to
the exempt categories.54
As with the fairness doctrine generally, the personal attack
and political editorial rules on their face are applicable to both
commercial and noncommercial broadcast stations and to origi-
nation cablecasting under the control of cable system opera-
tors. 55 The political editorial rules, however, do not have any
real relevance for noncommercial stations because Congress has
forbidden such broadcasters from editorializing or endorsing
particular candidates for political office.
56
C. Emerging Giiideposts in Post-1967 Decisions
The most important post-1967 development involving the
personal attack and political editorial rules-and indeed the
fairness doctrine itself-was the Supreme Court's decision in Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,57 which held the rules and the un-
derlying fairness doctrine to be both statutorily authorized and
constitutional. Aside from indicating that, as in general fairness
doctrine cases, a licensee may not insist on payment from an
attacked party for reply time, however, the case did not shed
much light on how the rules were to be implemented.
A string of FCC decisions beginning in the late 1960's do
51 33 Fed. Reg. 5,363. If a personal attack occurs in an exempt news program
during discussion of a controversial public issue, the licensee may present "the contrast-
ing viewpoint on the attack issue" itself under the general fairness doctrine. Id. If the
licensee has not and does not plan to do so, it is not appropriate for the licensee to
make over-the-air offers of time to respond. "There is a clear and appropriate spokes-
man to present the other side of the attack issue-the person or group attacked." Id.
The licensee should notify and allow "the person or group attacked a reasonable oppor-
tunity to respond." Id. In the latter situation, however, the precise time limitation and
notification requirements of the personal attack rules do not apply. See Rev. Paul E.
Driscoll, 40 F.C.C.2d 448 (1973) (fairness doctrine applicable to alleged attack on Rev.
Driscoll and Catholic Church made during exempt bona fide news interview).
55 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.123(a)(b) (AM radio), .300(a)(b) (FM radio), .598(a)(b) (noncom-
mercial educational FM radio), .679(a)(b) (TV stations), 76.209(b)(c) (origination cable-
casting over cable TV systems) (1976).
56 47 U.S.C. § 399(a) (Supp. V 1975).
57 395 U.S. 367 (1969); see text accompanying notes 134-35 infra. For discussions
of Red Lion, see F. FRIENDLY, THE GOOD Guys, THE BAD Guys, AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT, 32-77 (1976); Blake, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC: Fairness and the
Emperor's New Clothes, 23 FED. Coa. B.J. 75 (1969); Firestein, Red Lion and the Fairness
Doctrine: Regulation of Broadcasting "in the Public Interest," 11 ARz. L. REv. 807 (1969); 15
S.D. L. REV. 172 (1970). One recent interesting allegation with first amendment impli-
cations is the charge that the complainant in Red Lion was actually working with the
Democratic Party as part of a secret national campaign on behalf of the Kennedy Ad-
ministration to utilize the personal attack rules and general fairness doctrine to silence
or hamper right wing commentators. See F. FRIENDLY, supra, at 33-42.
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provide some guidance. The FCC stated repeatedly that passing
references to58 or mere disagreement with 59 individuals or
groups do not constitute attacks. It indicated that an attack can
be made even when an individual is not named specifically, as
long as he is sufficiently identified." The Commission reaf-
firmed the attack rules' exemption of newscasts,61 bona fide
news interviews,62 and attacks made on candidates by supporters
of other candidates. 63 It stressed that, because the purpose of the
rules is to inform the public on "vital issues of the day" and not
to settle private disputes, for the personal attack rules to apply
the attack must occur during discussion of a controversial issue
of public importance.
64
58 See, e.g., Herschel Kasten, 39 F.C.C.2d 566 (1973).
59See, e.g., Port of N.Y. Auth., 25 F.C.C.2d 417, 418 (1970); Miners Broadcasting
Serv., Inc., 20 F.C.C.2d 1061, 1063 n.6 (1970).
6" See Rev. Paul E. Driscoll, 40 F.C.C.2d 448 (1973). Driscoll can be read as implying
that a person can be identified sufficiently for personal attack rule purposes without
being specifically named because the Staff did not question complainant's assertion that
the broadcast sufficiently identified him. The letter, however, did not directly comment
on the identification issue because it found that the comments were made during a
bona fide news interview. But see Diocese of Rockville Centre, 50 F.C.C.2d 330 (1973)
(charges that the men in the Roman Catholic Church were led into it "merely by ambi-
tion" and were "hypocritical and immoral" did not identify sufficiently the alleged at-
tack victims).
61 Quechee Lakes Corp., 38 F.C.C.2d 1039 (1973) (accusation within news broad-
casts that land development corporation used deceitful practices); Dorothy Healey, 24
F.C.C.2d 487 (1970), aff'd sub nom. Healey v. FCC, 460 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(broadcaster calling individual Marxist, Communist, and atheist in commentary part of
news broadcast). But cf. Walker and Salveter, [1975] 32 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 839, 844
(the "Commission has not exempted the labeled station or network editorial, even if
occurring in one of these exempt categories").
62 Rev. Paul E. Driscoll, 40 F.C.C.2d 448 (1973) (alleged attack made during bona
fide news interview).
63 Thomas R. Asher, 38 F.C.C.2d 300 (1972) (accusation that President Nixon's
supporters distorted Senator McGovern's welfare position and personally attacked him
in campaign advertisements). Under the political editorial and the personal attack rules,
the Commission looks to the definition of "legally qualified candidate" as interpreted
under the equal time requirements of § 315 of the Communications Act of 1934, 47
U.S.C. § 315 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). See Arthur W. Arundel, 14 F.C.C.2d 199 (1968)
(editorial endorsement of Robert Kennedy for President required notification and op-
portunity to respond for other legally qualified candidates, but not for Senator Hum-
phrey, who had not yet announced his candidacy); Senator Eugene J. McCarthy, 11
F.C.C.2d 511 (1968) (since personal attack rules are inapplicable to a legally qualified
candidate's attack on another such candidate, alleged personal attack made by President
Johnson must be based on assumption that Johnson was not yet a legally qualified
candidate). An attack made by a legally qualified candidate upon a person not a candi-
date or associated with a candidate is subject to the personal attack requirements, de-
spite the fact that the licensee cannot censor comments by candidates under § 315.
Capitol Cities Broadcasting, 13 F.C.C.2d 869 (1968) (candidate identified noncandidates
as having been indicted for sedition, referred to their allegedly "subversive activities,"
and quoted excerpts from grand jury report).
64 National Ass'n of Gov't Employees, 41 F.C.C.2d 965 (1973).
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The Commission also emphasized the importance of the
notification obligations. If there is any question whether state-
ments made in a broadcast comprise a personal attack within the
meaning of the rules, the licensee must retain a tape, script, or
contemporaneously made summary of the remarks. 5 The FCC
further declared that licensee inquiries to the Commission seek-
ing advice on whether an attack has occurred should be made
promptly, and that, despite any uncertainty, the potentially at-
tacked party should be notified within the prescribed seven-day
period.
66
FCC decisions further refined the meaning of "a reasonable
opportunity to respond" in the personal attack context. As in the
area of the general fairness doctrine, "what constitutes a reason-
able opportunity to respond" is largely a "matter ... for the
good faith, reasonable judgment of the licensee. ' 67 This "good
faith, reasonable judgment" must be made by the licensee with
regard to both the placement of the response program and the
amount of time to be afforded for the reply.6 8 The Commission,
however, tightened these loose-fitting fairness doctrine require-
ments by forbidding a licensee to insist that a reply to a personal
attack be made as part of roundtable or panel discussion, where
a moderator and questions or debate are involved. 69 Instead, the
65 Dr. Morris Crothers, 32 F.C.C.2d 864 (1971). The Commission stated that al-
though the licensee
had no obligation to tape such remarks, under the circumstances of this case
[it] should have retained a tape if one was made or, if a recording was not
made, retained at least an accurate and contemporaneously made summary or
transcript of the remarks, instead of relying on "recollections" of [its] mod-
erator ....
Id. at 865. As do many of the personal attack cases, Crothers involved a phone-in talk
show.
66 Station WGCB, 41 F.C.C.2d 340, 342 (1973) ("A three months delay in seeking
Commission advice obviously precludes any finding of a reasonable attempt of com-
pliance with the rule.").
6 t John Birch Soc'y, 11 F.C.C.2d 790, 791 (1968).
681d. at 791. The Commission added that the licensee should consider "the time
devoted to the attack and other pertinent considerations," and, in the "case of an attack
in a program which is one of a series," a reasonable judgment may be demonstrated by
"inclusion of the response during a portion of the time period regularly allotted to the
series . . . if otherwise fair to the person attacked . . .and if effectuated by the licensee
and not simply delegated to someone associated with the program series." Id. See Sta-
tion WGCB, 41 F.C.C.2d 340, 342 (1973) (reasonable opportunity is "initially to be
worked out by the licensee and the party"); John M. Slack, 26 F.C.C.2d 11 (1970) (three
minutes reply time on 6 and 11 p.m. news is reasonable); Dean C. Steele, 18 F.C.C.2d
661 (1969) (offering an attacked party precisely equal time is reasonable).
69John Birch Soc'y, 11 F.C.C.2d 790, 791-92 (1968). Under the general fairness
doctrine, a licensee may determine the format in which a spokesman will present his
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attacked party must be afforded a more direct opportunity to
reply, although the licensee can insist that the reply be reason-
ably responsive to the attack." The attacked party's reply may
not be prefaced or followed by repetition or justification of the
original attack,71 nor may the licensee determine the reply
spokesman-as he may in the ordinary fairness situation-
because the person who responds ordinarily should be the per-
son who was attacked or his designated spokesman. 72 If the at-
tacked party is on the line of a radio phone-in show while the
attack takes place and has an immediate opportunity to respond,
however, the licensee, without more, has complied with the per-
sonal attack rules.
73
"A reasonable opportunity to respond" has undergone simi-
lar case law definition in the political editorial context in the
post-1967 period. The FCC held that if a candidate's response to
a station's endorsement of another candidate is preceded by
repetition of the endorsement, the reply opportunity is not
reasonable and the licensee will incur additional reply obligations
unless the responding candidate either agrees to the repetition
or is going to challenge the original endorsement by "specific
mention thereof. ' 74 Moreover, the Commission tightened the
parameters of what constitutes a reasonable opportunity to re-
spond. Thus, total time ratios of approximately 4 to 175 and 2.7
to 176 (licensee editorial time to candidate reply time) were con-
sidered unreasonable, as were frequency of broadcast ratios of 4
opposing views. Fairness Report, supra note 4, at 26,378; Editorializing Report, supra
note 4, at 1251, 1257-58.
7"John Birch Soc'y, 11 F.C.C.2d 790, 792 (1968) (licensee's rejection of a general
film about Robert Welch offered as a rebuttal to attacks on the John Birch Society
upheld). A licensee's judgment on the responsiveness of a proposed reply to a personal
attack may, of course, be deemed unreasonable. See Radio Albany, Inc., 40 F.C.C. 632,
634 (1965) (licensee's judgment that Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s proposed reply to
editorial attack was unresponsive to the attack found unreasonable).
71 Station WGCB, 41 F.C.C.2d 340 (1973).
72 See Radio Albany, Inc., 40 F.C.C. 632, 633 (1965).
73 Lew H. Cherry, 25 F.C.C.2d 887 (1970).
71 Mario Procaccino, 20 F.C.C.2d 451 (1969).
7 5James Spurling, 30 F.C.C.2d 675 (1971) (unreasonable, in city council election,
for licensee editorial to devote 25 lines to endorsement of two other candidates and
opposition to complainant's candidacy, and allow only six lines for reply; 4 to 1 total
time ratio assumption is based on 4 to 1 total line ratio).
76 Bill Bishop, 30 F.C.C.2d 829 (1971) (unreasonable for licensee to air seven
editorial endorsements of one candidate for mayor totalling 11 minutes, 24 seconds but
allow opposing candidate's spokesman to reply in only two broadcasts totalling four
minutes, 18seconds).
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to 177 and 7 to 278 (number of licensee editorial broadcasts to
candidate reply broadcasts). Although precisely equal time has
not been required under the political editorial rules, 9 greater
equality is demanded than in the general fairness context.8" The
Commission declared: "In many instances a comparable oppor-
tunity in time and scheduling will be clearly appropriate" in the
political editorial and personal attack situations. 81
III. PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
PERSONAL ATTACK RULES
The FCC's rulings in the personal attack area have left an
inconsistent and confusing trail of precedent on the critical ques-
tions of what constitutes a personal attack, what constitutes a
controversial issue of public importance and how closely the at-
tack must follow or precede discussion of the issue in order to be
"during the presentation" of that issue. The precedent has gen-
erated other problems as well.
A. What Constitutes an Attack?
The following are demonstrative pairings of Commission
rulings on what constitutes a personal attack under the rules.
82
(1) Claiming that' a County Board had "'hoodwinked' a
governmental agency" in part by using county vehicles for "taxi
service" and had sold land in violation of the law, and accusing a
7 George E. Cooley, 10 F.C.C.2d 969 (1967) (unreasonable for licensee to endorse
candidate in 24 twenty-second editorials and offer candidate's opponent six twenty-
second response broadcasts).
718 Bill Bishop, 30 F.C.C.2d 829 (1971).
79 32 Fed. Reg. 10,305 (1967). Moreover, the licensee may require appearance of a
candidate's spokesman instead of the candidate himself to avoid equal time obligations.
Id. "Barring extraordinary circumstances" the choice of said spokesman is up to the
candidate. Id. n.9. The licensee should look to equal time case law to define a "legally
qualified candidate" in the political editorial context. Arthur L. Arundel, 14 F.C.C.2d
199 (1968). Unlike the equal time situation, in which the licensee can wait until the
opposing candidates contact him for equal opportunities, the licensee must notify other
candidates of his political editorials on his own initiative. Text accompanying notes 38 &
43 supra.
8, Total time ratios of 5.6 to 1 have been held reasonable under the general fair-
ness doctrine, National Broadcasting Co., 16 F.C.C.2d 956 (1969), and frequency ratios
of "4 or 5" to 1 similarly have been upheld, Wilderness Soc'y, 31 F.C.C.2d 729, 735
(1971) (concurring statement of Chairman Burch).
11 32 Fed. Reg. 10,305 (1967).
82 The Commission has stressed that the truth or falsity of a statement is not de-
terminative of whether there has been a personal attack and that the Commission
makes no inquiry into the accuracy of the alleged attack. Lew H. Cherry, 25 F.C.C.2d
887, 888 (1970).
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county commissioner of taking a "champagne flight" for per-
sonal gratification when only authorized to fly on government
business, do not constitute personal attacks; 3 but suggesting that
the management of a local radio station may have dynamited the
station transmitter to hoodwink the insurance company and
fraudulently collect insurance proceeds, does.
84
(2) Asserting that the Roman Catholic Church was illegally
lobbying against abortion 85 and that a state legislator was project-
ing a conflict of interest image because of his private dealings
86
are not attacks; but implying that a political candidate might be
receiving campaign contributions from crime figures, is.
s7
(3) Claiming that doctors and nurses in a hospital are "in-
competent" is not an attack;8 8 but suggesting that a female
newspaper reporter obtained good interviews because of the way
she positioned her legs and that she should get a job in a mas-
sage parlor, is. 89
(4) Calling a person an "extremist" and a "patriotic ex-
tremist" is not an attack; 9 but asserting that an institute and its
newsletter are "subversive," to the "Far Left," and run by a
"Communist," is.9 '
83 Senator Florian W. Chmielewski, 41 F.C.C.2d 201 (1973). The Commission
added:
Criticism of a public official's wisdom, judgment or actions is not necessarily an
attack upon his "honesty, character, integrity or like personal qualities," and we
have stated that we shall not impose penalties in this area if the licensee could
have had a reasonable doubt whether such an attack had taken place, or in-
deed in any case which does not involve a flagrant, clear-cut violation.
Id. at 207.
84 Richard S. Manne, 26 F.C.C.2d 583 (1970).
85 Rev. Paul E. Driscoll, 40 F.C.C.2d 448 (1973). The Commission declared:
[I]t should be clear that not all charges of illegality present attacks on honesty,
character or integrity. One may assert that a person or group has in fact acted
in violation of that law although the person or group assumed that such action
was in full accord with the law's provisions. In such case, the charge is one of
"illegality", but it is the judgment of the person or group in interpreting the
law which is questioned, not their honesty, character or integrity.
Id. at 450.
86 John J. Salchert, 48 F.C.C.2d 346 (1974) (legislator chaired a legislative nursing
home committee while working for several nursing homes).
87 Francis X. Bellotti, 10 F.C.C.2d 328 (1967).
88 Rome Hosp., 40 F.C.C.2d 452 (1973).
89 The Charlotte Observer, 38 F.C.C.2d 522 (1972). The Commission rejected the
station's assertions that the remarks were intended to be "humorous . . . not mali-
cious" and may only have demonstrated "questionable taste." Id. at 523.
9" Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., [1971] 21 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 497. The
Commission added: "Mere mention of groups of persons, or even certain types of un-
favorable references thereto, do not constitute personal attacks as defined by the Com-
mission." Id. at 497.
91 WIYN Radio, Inc., 35 F.C.C.2d 175 (1972).
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(5) Stating that a university is a "breeding ground for Arab
revolutionaries and terrorists," a "Guerrilla U.," and a "pipeline
to the Palestinian guerrilla movement" is not an attack;92 but
claiming that the John Birch Society engages in "physical abuse
and violence" and "local terror campaigns against opposition
figures,' 93 and asserting that the United Church of Christ is
"part of a conspiracy to cause prison unrest through illegal and
violent means" and is financing "violent and/or subversive"
groups, are.
94
(6) Calling two United States Senators "liberals and social-
ists" is not an attack;95 but declaring that a university professor
is a "Communist," is.96
(7) Declaring that a teacher federation was subjecting the
public to "blackmail," demanding "blood money," and in effect
that its members were "unscrupulous criminals" is not a personal
attack;97 but calling a congressman a "coward" for not appearing
on an interview show, is.
9 8
Many of these decisions, analyzed individually, do not ap-
pear unreasonable. 99 But, as Professor Benno Schmidt suggests,
92 J. Allen Carr, 30 F.C.C.2d 894 (1971).
93 John Birch Soc'y, 11 F.C.C.2d 790, 791 (1968).
" Station WGCB, 41 F.C.C.2d 340, 342 (1973).
95 Thomas O'Brien, 42 F.C.C.2d 1106 (1973). The Commission added: "Comments
of this nature refer to political ideological beliefs and do not constitute character de-
nunciation." Id. at 1107. In light of the FCC's affording personal attack replies to those
termed "Communist," this statement is astounding.
96 Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc., 24 F.C.C.2d 18, 26 (1970), aff'd, 473 F.2d
16 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973); cf. William M. Kunstler, 11 F.C.C.2d
678 (1973) (characterizing a club as a Communist organization is an attack).
91 Philadelphia Fed'n of Teachers, 48 F.C.C.2d 507, 510 (1974).
98 Straus Communications, Inc., 51 F.C.C.2d 385 (1975), vacated and remanded,
530 F.2d 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Commissioner Robinson, in dissent, made the following
telling comments on Straus in light of Philadelphia Fed'n of Teachers:
No differences in the dictionary definition of the vituperative words used, and
nothing in common sense can make these two cases consistent. I can find no
principle that justifies them. It may be, of course, that these are among the
species of cases for which principles do not really suffice, and that must conse-
quently be decided according to the length of the Chancellor's foot. If a certain
amount of arbitrariness is necessary to finish important business in realms
where mere language will not carry us, so be it. But in such cases, it is the
Chancellor's duty at least to try to keep his foot from changing size like Alice
in Wonderland.
51 F.C.C.2d at 390 (Commissioner Robinson, dissenting) (footnote omitted).
99 For examples of other comments held not to be personal attacks, see Thaddeus
Kowalski, 42 F.C.C.2d 1110 (1973) (making "Pollack jokes"); John Cervase, 42 F.C.C.2d
613 (1973) (calling an individual a "political opportunist"); Dewey M. Duckett, Jr., 23
F.C.C.2d 872 (1970) (calling an individual a "spook").
Consistently with the general fairness doctrine, see text accompanying notes 4-6
supra, the FCC claims to use a "reasonableness" standard in assessing licensee determi-
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when rulings such as these "are read together, the decisions
seem haphazard, and they hopelessly confuse any effort to
figure out what general principles delineate the scope of the
personal attack rules.""' The Commission often fails even to
provide rationales for its findings that particular comments con-
stitute personal attacks.""
To be sure, some generalizations can be made. The Com-
mission does not seem to consider mere policy disagreements'
1
1
2
or charges of incompetence or bad judgment'1 3 to be personal
attacks. Allegations of criminal activity, 1 4 moral turpitude,
communist or subversive activity, or promotion of violence, on
the other hand, generally are held to constitute such attacks.
Nevertheless, as the above cases indicate, the pattern is ex-
tremely hard to follow and riddled with inconsistency. For ex-
nations of when personal attacks have been made. See, e.g., Senator Florian W.
Chmielewski, 41 F.C.C.2d 201, 208 (1973) ("[T]he question . . . is not what our initial
view might be . . . but rather whether the licensee could reasonably judge the allega-
tions not to involve personal attacks."). This flexible view might seem to explain the
Commission's inconsistent holdings outlined at text accompanying notes 83-98 supra.
The question, however, then becomes: "What sorts of determinations will be found
'reasonable?'" The answers to that question are no more coherent and provide no more
guidance than the answers to the original question: "What sorts of remarks will be
found to constitute personal attacks?" In other words, the problem remains however
the question is formulated.
'"' B. SCHMIDT, JR., FREEDOM OF THE PRESS VS. PUBLIC ACCESS 171 (1976).
"'i See, e.g., Francis X. Bellotti, 10 F.C.C.2d 328 (1967); note 87 supra & accom-
panying text.
1)12 The distinction between policy differences and charges of dishonesty, moral
turpitude, or criminal conduct, however, may be extremely tenuous. See, e.g., Sidney
Willens, 33 F.C.C.2d 304, 306 (1972) (A charge that judges handed out illegal sentences
found not to be an attack, the Commission stating that there "is an important distinc-
tion ... between contending that a judge has exceeded his discretion in the legal sense
... and charging that he has decided a case because of improper or corrupt motives.");
John B. Walsh, 31 F.C.C.2d 726 (1971) (A charge that county supervisors engaged in
mental gymnastics and were inconsistent in providing free office space to senator and
enacting a tax increase found not to be an attack.); Port of N.Y. Auth., 25 F.C.C.2d
417, 418 (1970) (A charge that Port Authority Commissioners were secretive and de-
veloped port in a way "most profitable to them" found not to be an attack, the Commis-
sion noting that "strong disagreement, even vehemently expressed, does not constitute a
personal attack, in the absence of an attack upon character or integrity."); notes 83, 85,
97 supra & accompanying text.
""3 See, e.g., Herschel Kasten, [1973] 27 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 93 (calling a person
unqualified to be head of a college); Robert B. Choate, 29 F.C.C.2d 73 (1971) (charge
that individual's conclusions about biology topics were childish and that he was not
suited for any work not an attack).
104 See, e.g., Joseph A. Gillis, 43 F.C.C.2d 584 (1973) (claims that a doctor is a con-
victed abortionist, had "paid off police officers" to continue his "abortion racket," and
had gone to jail rather than describe his payoffs to the Grand Jury is an attack); Dr.
John Gabler, 40 F.C.C.2d 579 (1973) (accusing doctor of unethical conduct in deaths of
two boys and of having been convicted for the death of one boy is an attack).
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ample, in many cases, the line between charges of incompetence
and bad judgment and those involving integrity or character
seems very unclear and difficult to administer. Indeed, insofar as
the purpose of the rules is to keep the public informed about
important, controversial issues, it would seem that questions
about certain individuals' competence and judgment often may
be more important than other private, moral questions. Commis-
sion rulings, however, do not seem to be consistently sensitive to
the purposes behind the rules.
B. What Is a Controversial Issue
of Public Importance?
As earlier noted,'",' an attack triggers the rules' obligations
only if it occurs during discussion of a controversial issue of
public importance. Therefore, the question of whether an issue
raised is controversial and of public importance, so troublesome
in the general fairness doctrine context,"" must be answered.
The Commission usually has failed to provide any rationale for
why a particular issue is considered to be controversial or of
public importance. The factors of media coverage, official and
community leader attention, and impact that were stressed in the
1974 Fairness Report, 1 1 7 are generally ignored. Thus, the radio
discussion of a national organization's alleged association with
Communists and alleged infiltration of the Methodist Church
were found to be "clearly . . . controversial issues of public im-
portance" in WIYN Radio, Inc.1118 Yet no evidence of controversy
in the community or statements by officials or leaders indicating
the issue's importance was offered by the Commission to support
its "clear" conclusion. The same lack of analysis is evident in
See text accompanying notes 11, 39 supra.
106 The FCC itself has stated, "One of the most difficult problems involved in the
administration of the fairness doctrine is the determination of the specific issue or is-
sues raised by a particular program." Fairness Report, supra note 4, at 26,376. The
Commission has laid down a series of inconsistent decisions on what issue is raised in a
broadcast and whether it is controversial and of public importance. See, e.g., Accuracy in
Media, Inc., 40 F.C.C.2d 958 (1973), remanded with direction to vacate order and dismiss
complaint sub nora. National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1974),
cert. denied sub nom. Accuracy in Media, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 424 U.S. 910
(1976); National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, 1156 (1974) (Bazelon, C.J.,
dissenting); Simmons, Commercial Advertising and the Fairness Doctrine; The New F.C.C.
Polic'y in Perspective, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1083, 1086-1100 (1975); Comment, The Regula-
tion of Comipeting First Amiendmient Rights: A New Fairness Doctrine Balance After CBS?, 122
U. PA. L. REV. 1283, 1293-1304 (1974).
111 Fairness Report, supra note 4, at 26,376.
"1" 35 F.C.C.2d 175, 180 (1972).
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other Commission conclusions on whether issues, such as the
role of the radical right'4 9 or whether the DuBois Clubs are
being used by the Communist Party to subvert American
youth,"" are controversial and of public importance. The
Commission's rejection of some personal attack complaints be-
cause the complainants had not "furnished the Commission with
any information to indicate that there was a public debate or
controversy in the community ... so as to create a controversial
issue of public importance," ' is absurd in light of its totally
unsupported conclusions in other cases.
As might be expected from the Commission's failure to sup-
ply supporting rationales, the FCC's decisions on whether issues
are controversial and of public importance display a lack of con-
sistency. For example, the Commission found that the dismissal
of an individual doctor from a city hospital was a controversial
issue of public importance, 112 but an election between branches
of two national labor unions involving 1,230 employees and af-
fecting thousands of households was held not to involve such an
issue.1 13 A station management's alleged dynamiting of its
transmitter in violation of public interest responsibilities was a
controversial issue of public importance,' 14 but a license renewal
application, the success of which similarly determined whether
the station could continue to broadcast, was not." 5
C. The "During the Presentation" Requirement
A significant question that has received very little attention
is how close in time the personal attack must be to the discussion
of the controversial issue of public importance in order for the
attack to have been made "during the presentation" of that issue.
The few Commission and staff statements on this question indi-
cate that the FCC is taking an overly expansive view of when an
'"John Birch Soc'y, 11 F.C.C.2d 790 (1968).
'William M. Kunstler, 11 F.C.C.2d 678 (1968).
"' National Ass'n of Gov't Employees, 41 F.C.C.2d 965, 966-67 (1973).
112 Dr. John Gabler, 40 F.C.C.2d 579 (1973). The licensee apparently admitted,
however, that the dismissal involved a controversial issue of public importance. Id. at
580.
1 3 Id.
114 Richard S. Manne, 26 F.C.C.2d 583 (1970). The conclusion, typically, was
reached without any supporting evidence or rationale.
15 Duane Lindstrom, 26 F.C.C.2d 373 (1970). Lindstrom was a general fairness doc-
trine case; newspaper articles submitted by complainant did "not demonstrate that the
license renewal of one or more specific stations is a controversial issue of public impor-
tance." Id. at 375 n.4.
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attack is made during the presentation of an issue.
In Richard S. Manne,116 an accusation that a rival station had
intentionally dynamited its transmitter was considered a personal
attack made during discussion of a controversial public issue
even though the Commission had not received the "specific lan-
guage of the discussion during which the statement was made
.... ,,1 That the station making the broadcast had engaged in a
"continuing discussion" of the construction and operation of the
rival station was considered sufficient to establish that the "dur-
ing the presentation" requirement had been met.
Three years later, in Thomas O'Brien,"18 this requirement was
given a seemingly more restricted reading. Unnamed college
professors were accused of treason in the first of a three-part
program, and two were named in the second and third parts.
The "during the presentation" requirement was met "even
though the charge of treason and the naming of the professors
took place in three different portions of the speech, since the
three portions are so closely related as to constitute a continuing
discussion of the same issue."' 19 This result seems reasonable; all
three parts dealt with the same topic and explicitly were pre-
sented by the broadcaster as interdependent segments.
Straus Communications, Inc.2 " is the most significant case
dealing with this issue. The case involved a comment made by
Bob Grant, the host of a phone-in show on radio station WMCA
in New York City. On March 8, 1973, Grant began the phone-
in program by reviewing the news of the day, including the
nationwide meat boycott then in progress. Shortly after an-
nouncing that Benjamin Rosenthal, a local congressman and
leader in the boycott, would soon be interviewed over the phone,
Grant learned that Rosenthal had refused to be interviewed.
Grant then told the audience of Rosenthal's refusal, suggested it
might have resulted from past differences between the con-
gressman and himself, and emphasized that he nonetheless
agreed with the congressman on the boycott issue. Grant added
that he could not believe the congressman "was afraid to come
on" the program and that Rosenthal should lay aside his
116 26 F.C.C.2d 583 (1970).
11 Id. at 584.
118 42 F.C.C.2d 1106 (1973).
119 Id. at 1108-09.
1211 51 F.C.C.2d 385 (1975), vacated and remanded, 530 F.2d 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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"prejudices" and discuss the "public issue." 121 At approximately
12:45 P.M., a full two hours after these comments were made,
Grant was discussing with a caller some vaguely suggested im-
proprieties involving mothballed government ships. In response
to the caller's spontaneous outburst of praise for Grant, Grant
stated: "[W]hen I hear about guys like Ben Rosenthal . . . I have
to say I wish there were a thousand Bob Grants 'cause then you
wouldn't have . . .a coward like him in the United States Con-
gress .... "122
After Rosenthal filed a complaint, the Commission ruled
that the "coward" comment was a personal attack, finding that
the controversial issue of public importance was the nationwide
meat boycott that Grant had discussed at 10:45 A.M. Most of
those listening during the 12:45 lunch hour, when Rosenthal was
called a coward, probably never heard the boycott issue dis-
cussed. For these listeners, the remark, thrown into an un-
related discussion of mothballed ships, must have made little
sense. Those persons who did hear the earlier discussion doubt-
less would have realized that it was nothing more than Grant ex-
pressing frustration at Rosenthal's refusal to be interviewed.
The Commission, however, supplying no further analysis, cited
Manne and O'Brien to support its conclusion that the attack was
made during the presentation of the boycott issue.1 23 Both cases
are arguably inapposite, however, because, in each, the attacks
were made in the context of continuing discussions of the issue
in question.
The case was appealed to the Circuit Court for the District
of Columbia, which reversed the Commission's decision.1 24 The
court found that the station's arguments that Grant's remark did
not occur during discussion of a controversial public issue "could
hardly be called insubstantial,"' 25 and concluded that the Com-
mission had "made its own judgment, instead of judging the
objective reasonableness of the licensee's determination."' 26 That
"[t]he Commission's decision amounted to a significant extension
of the Personal Attack Rule to embrace instances where an al-
leged attack is separated by a substantial time lapse from the
121 Id. at 385.
122 1d.
,23 Id. at 387.
124 Straus Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 530 F.2d 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
'
25 Id. at 1010.
'
26
Id. at 1011.
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issue discussion to which it supposedly relates"1 27 was considered
a further demonstration of the reasonableness and good faith of
the station.
The Commission must reconsider its position in future
cases. The court, in a footnote, pointed out that its opinion
would not necessarily bar the Commission's interpretation once
that interpretation is communicated to broadcasters.' 28 But when
the relation of an attack to the underlying issue is as remote
as it was in Straus, the policies underlying the attack rules-in-
forming the public, providing access for the expression of views,
and preventing stations from exercising undue political in-
fluencel 29-are not served by requiring the station to offer an
opportunity to respond. In Straus the remarks simply had noth-
ing to do with the issue being discussed-mothballed ships-and
were exceedingly remote in time from the identified controver-
sial issue of public importance, the meat boycott 3 "° The Com-
mission's interpretation, at least as evidenced in Straus and
Marine, seems so broad as to practically read the "during the
presentation" requirement out of the attack rules.
D. Other Problems
Although the Commission has exempted bona fide news-
casts, on-the-spot coverage of news events and news interviews,
as well as news commentary or analysis contained in any of these
formats,13 ' it has not exempted news documentaries or news
commentary outside of the above contexts. If standard journalis-
tic practices justify an exemption for other forms of news
coverage,' 3 2 they likewise should justify an exemption for news
documentaries. Broadcasters surely do not lose their journalistic
standards when they move from one form of news coverage to
another.
The Commission has indicated that, in providing an oppor-
127 Id.
12 1Id. n.28.
125 See text accompanying notes 9-10 supra.
1-1 Even had the remarks borne a closer relationship to the controversial issue of
public importance, in terms of the articulated purposes of the rules one must wonder
what purpose would have been served by requiring an opportunity to respond. What
additional public knowledge about the boycott would have been gained by hearing Con-
gressman Rosenthal's reaction to being called a coward for not appearing on Bob Grant's
phone-in show? See text accompanying notes 135-41 infra.
"I, See text accompanying notes 50-52 supra.
M See note 51 supra & accompanying text.
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tunity to respond to an attack, total time and frequency ratios
and time of day comparisons must be closer than in the general
fairness context.' 33 It has failed to go further, however, and
define more precisely what constitutes a "comparative opportu-
nity" for the attack victim.
Similarly, the Commission has not addressed the length of
time a broadcaster may wait, after notifying the attack victim,
before airing the response. In the political editorial situation, the
election places a natural outer limit for responses, but no such
easy answers exist in the personal attack context.
Finally, if a dispute erupts over whether a reply opportunity
must be given, the Commission may take close to a year to rule
on the matter-by which time the election may have been held
or the attack forgotten. Of course, some administrative delay is
inevitable, but the record indicates that the FCC has been lax in
its administration of these disputes.
1 34
IV. THE ARGUMENT FOR REPEAL OF THE
PERSONAL ATTACK RULES
Although the Commission's enforcement of the personal at-
tack rule deserves criticism, the real problem lies in the rule
itself. The rule's failure to serve the policies underlying the fair-
ness doctrine, the administrative complications the rule has
spawned, its impingement on first amendment freedoms, and
the availability of alternative relief support the conclusion that
the rule should be repealed in toto.
The attack rule, as part of the fairness doctrine, is justifiable
only to the extent it furthers that doctrine's policies. The attack
rules do not fulfill the objectives of informing the public and
providing alternative viewpoints with media access on important
issues. Response opportunities are required only when the dis-
cussion ceases to focus on issues and turns to ad hominifem argu-
mentation. The rules do not apply if a specific ballot issue is en-
dorsed or attacked, a major controversial issue in the community
133 See note 80 supra & accompanying text.
134 A study of all fairness cases considered during the first half of 1973 found an
"average delay of about eight months between broadcast and ruling." The study also
revealed a "number of cases in which several years elapsed." Geller, The Fairness Doc-
trine in Broadcasting, 37 & app. D (Dec. 1973) (Rand R-1412F.F.). In Francis X. Bellotti,
10 F.C.C.2d 328 (1967), for example, the original complaint was made on Oct. 20, 1966,
a few weeks prior to the November election; the Commission's ruling was delivered on
Sept. 27, 1967.
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is discussed, or a critical piece of legislation is criticized. What
great democratic public benefit comes from knowing that a re-
porter may not have used her legs to get stories or that a radio
station's managers may not have defrauded an insurance con-
pany? To a large extent, the personal attack rules generate name
calling exercises, allowing those parties whose personalities are
criticized to rebut the charges without requiring rebuttal oppor-
tunities on the more substantive issues.
Nor do the attack rules deal directly with the problem of
broadcasters' undue influence on important public issues. Re-
sponse opportunities must be extended only when remarks focus
on personal qualities rather than on the underlying issues. Per-
sonal attack exchanges, however, do not really address the impor-
tant public questions. Moreover, rather than resulting from a sta-
tion management's deliberate decision to influence the public, the
cases suggest that personal attacks usually result from a caller's
comments, an interviewee's remarks, or a talk show host's getting
carried away on the air.
Although the personal attack and political editorial rules
were held to be constitutional in Red Lion,13 5 the failure of the
personal attack rules to serve fairness doctrine policies suggests
that the rules deserve reconsideration. Although the Red Lion
Court suggested that the rules do impose restraints on broad-
casters' exercise of their first amendment rights, it nonetheless
determined:
Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Gov-
ernment is permitted to put restraints on licensees in
favor of others whose views should be expressed on this
unique medium. . . . It is the right of the viewers and
listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is
paramount. . . . It is the right of the public to receive
suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and
other ideas and experiences which is crucial here.13 6
Now that it has become clear that the attack rules do not really
provide an opportunity for spokesmen to address or for the
public to be informed about important substantive public issues,
Red Lion's justification for the attack rules' restraints on broad-
casters' rights is called into question.
13M 395 U.S. 367 (1969); see text accompanying note 57 supra.
136 Id. at 390.
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Despite the FCC's declaratiohs that the personal attack rules
are only meant to inform further the public on important public
issues, it is obvious that one of their key objectives is to protect
the reputations of the individuals who are attacked. Given the
burdens that the attack rules impose on broadcasters, such pro-
tection is poor justification for the rules, especially in light of the
remedy for infringements of reputation provided by the law of
defamation. Even were the personal attack rules to be justified in
part as a defamation remedy, however, their provisions seem
contrary to accepted principles of defamation law.
The personal attack rules stand the defamation standard on
its head. As New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 37 and its progeny
have established, a higher liability standard protects newspapers
when they attack a public figure l3 8 as opposed to a private
person. 139 In the personal attack situation, however, broadcast
media burdens are precisely the opposite: an attack on a public
figure, someone involved with an important public issue, triggers
a heavier broadcaster burden. The broadcaster must follow
rigorous notification procedures and has limited discretion in
creating a reply opportunity. If a private figure, one not con-
nected with a public issue, is attacked, however, the attack rules
are not brought into play, and the broadcaster need not notify
that person or broadcast any reply.
One might'argue that insofar as Sullivan deprived public
figures of a monetary damage remedy because their access to the
media was, in effect, a sufficient alternative remedy, the personal
attack rules serve to assure the effectiveness of that alternative
remedy. A person involved in a controversial issue of public
importance, however, is sufficiently assured of adequate media
137 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
138 A public official cannot recover damages "for a defamatory falsehood relating to
his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual
malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not." Id. at 279-80. See also Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (Sullivan
standard applies to right of privacy action against magazine by private individuals in-
volved in incident of public interest); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966) (criticism
of former supervisor of county-owned ski resort); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64
(1964) (criticism of state criminal court judges).
139 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974):
[P]rivate individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury than public officials
and public figures; they are also more deserving of recovery. . . . [W]e con-
clude that the States should retain substantial latitude in their efforts to en-
force a legal remedy for defamatory falsehood injurious to the reputation of a
private individual.
Id. at 345-46.
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coverage without the imposition of added burdens on broadcas-
ters. The rationales that private individuals do not have this
same "self-help" opportunities, that they have not chosen volun-
tarily public exposure as have public officials and figures, 14" and
that the media needs to be able to cover public issues and offi-
cials without being inhibited seem as relevant to broadcasters
and personal attacks as they do to newspapers and defamatory
statements. 14 1 The Commission has never explained these
theoretical cross currents between the thrust of media burdens
imposed under the personal attack rules and those imposed
under defamation standards.
Ill-fitted to fulfill their purported goals, the personal attack
rules also present large administrative difficulties for broad-
casters. A personal attack may occur virtually any time someone
speaks on the air. The licensee must decide whether an attack
was made, whether there was a controversial public issue, and
whether there was a sufficient nexus between the two. Once the
licensee finds these three elements to exist, the victim(s) of the
attack promptly must be notified and provided with a script,
tape, or accurate summary. Finally, the licensee must decide
what type of response opportunity is reasonable. Complex
judgmental decisions must be made, with a possible fine or loss
of license imposed if the FCC finds any of these decisions un-
reasonable. Such pressures well may inhibit the management
and staff of stations from fully expressing their views and cause
them to curtail the opportunities for broadcast expression of-
fered the public.
In sum, the personal attack rules have not fulfilled fairness
doctrine objectives, have generated severe administrative prob-
lems, and have raised constitutional concerns. For these reasons,
they should be repealed.
V. AN UNEASY CASE FOR RETENTION OF
MODIFIED POLITICAL EDITORIAL RULES
The political editorial rules are distinguishable in terms of
function, administration, and effect from the personal attack
rules. The editorial rules do represent restraints on broadcasters'
first amendment rights 142 and do impose administrative burdens
'i" See id. at 344-45.
141 See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270-83.
142 See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (a right of
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on broadcasters. On balance, however, they warrant retention.
In the political editorial situation the licensee not only con-
dones the editorial, he uses his exclusive and powerful airwave
frequency to explicitly advocate support of a candidate. There is
no attempt to balance facts as in a typical news broadcast. In-
deed, the licensee's objective is to bias the audience towards his
point of view. A broadcast spokesman reflects the views of sta-
tion management in a most direct way. The political editorial
rules require that the broadcaster let his listeners hear other
candidates with conflicting views. Thus, the political editorial
obligations directly further the fairness doctrine goal of prevent-
ing powerful broadcasters from unfairly using their influence.
The political editorial rules also further the other fairness doc-
trine objective of informing the public by granting access for
spokesmen to discuss important public issues. Candidates are
given the opportunity to address substantive campaign issues,143
and such political responses come at a critical time for demo-
cratic debate-immediately before an election.
Administratively, the political editorial rules, though not
unburdensome, 144 present fewer problems than the personal at-
tack rules. The licensee does not have to determine whether a
personal attack has occurred, what controversial issue of public
importance has been raised, and whether that issue is so con-
nected with the attack so as to have occurred during the attack.
These difficult judgmental questions are simply not relevant to
political editorials. The political editorial rules are triggered by a
licensee's endorsement of a specific individual. 145 Once this eas-
ily discernible event occurs, the rules come into operation.
reply for political candidates statutorily imposed by Florida on newspapers inhibited
newspaper journalists and violated the first amendment).
"' The need to supply every qualified candidate who was not favored in an edito-
rial the right to reply, however, undoubtedly inhibits some broadcasters from airing
political editorials. In the usual editorial or other fairness situation, only one or two
reply spokesmen need be presented. In the political editorial situation, many more may
be necessary, resulting in burdensome notification requirements and the offering of
much free time.
144 See note 147 infra & accompanying text (reply obligations resulting from editori-
als on an issue closely associated with a candidate). Complications also may arise in
determining when broadcast statements are the "official opinion" of the licensee and
thus subject to the political editorial rules. That editorial-type statements by broadcast
announcers are "made with the approval of the management of the station, does not
necessarily mean that the statements were intended or represented on the air as the
official opinion of the management of the station." Peter H. Beer, 48 F.C.C.2d 1067,
1068 (1974).
145 But see note 144 supra.
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Finally, it should be noted that the political editorial rules do
parallel existing equal time requirements. 146 As long as the latter
are in effect, the political editorial rules seem a natural corollary.
It would be inconsistent to require that broadcasters give candi-
dates equal opportunities to appear on their stations, yet allow
broadcasters to editorialize as much as they want in favor of or
against a particular candidate. The personal attack rules, on the
other hand, have no such connection with the statutory
framework.
Although the political editorial rules should be maintained,
some changes are desirable. The Commission could take much
of the guesswork out of compliance with the rules by providing
more precise guidelines on what constitutes a reasonable oppor-
tunity to respond. Reply parameters are tighter than in the tra-
ditional fairness setting, but they are still unnecessarily vague.
The political editorial rules have also been greatly complicated
by the FCC's invoking them whenever a station editorializes on
an issue clearly identified with a particular candidate, even if
the candidate is not directly opposed and the campaign is not
146 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (Supp. V 1975). The equal time rule itself has been the deserv-
ing object of criticism. See, e.g., Derby, Section 315: Analysis and Proposal, 3 HARV. J.
LEGIs. 257 (1965-66); Erbst, Equal Time for Candidates: Fairness or Frustration?, 34 So.
CAL. L. REv. 190 (1961). Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to explore the
hotly debated equal time rule, 42 U.S.C. § 315 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), equal time also
should be subject to reevaluation. The inhibitory effect of the free time aspects of this
rule may be even greater than the effects of the political editorial rule. An improved
structure might eliminate equal time requirements for any program on which a candi-
date appears but does not pay for his broadcast as he does for political commercials. In
light of the public's great need to hear issues discussed by candidates during campaign
periods, the major party candidates, at least in the presidential elections to begin with
(congressional elections could be phased in soon thereafter), might be given free back-
to-back periods of time to discuss the issues (perhaps one-half hour per candidate) each
week for five or six weeks prior to an election. Minor qualified candidates might be
given less time in accord with a prearranged formula based on previous vote tallies or
petition. These broadcasts would be devoted to discussions of issues in detail and would
be in addition to any presidential debates the networks might arrange (without any equal
time requirements if the debates were aired without payment from the candidates). Dur-
ing these time periods the candidates could discuss or present the issues as they wished,
without editorial interference. Such a scheme would fulfill the critical democratic need
for extended discussion of important public issues during campaign periods and get
away from the limited coverage of presidential issues inherent in short newscasts and
broad-ranging presidential debates. It would also mitigate many of the inhibitory effects
of the present equal time law and be simple to administer. Licensees would be free to
cover any candidates they chose, in any format they desired, without having to give
time to every other qualified political candidate. Unlike the political editorial situation,
where broadcasters are consciously trying to bias the public towards their point of view
about a candidate, the assumption would be that good journalistic practices would cause
licensees to be fair in their candidate coverage. Equal time requirements still would
prevail for paid political advertising, an arrangement that has a lesser inhibitory effect.
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mentioned.1 47 One need only consider the great number of im-
portant campaign issues with which candidates often can be
identified to appreciate the administrative problems inherent in
applying this obligation. Such an obligation too often could re-
sult in inhibiting broadcasters who want to speak out on the
issues. This interpretation also seems inconsistent with the FCC's
failure to impose any reply requirements for editorials on ballot
issues.
VI. CONCLUSION
The personal attack and political editorial rules have histori-
cally been wedded, but the time has come to sunder the union.
Although both were intended to serve the policies of the fairness
doctrine, only the political editorial rules have furthered those
goals. The failure of the personal attack rules is compounded by
the burdens they impose on broadcasters both administratively
and in the exercise of first amendment rights.
The long run solution to the problems raised by the per-
sonal attack and political editorial rules lies in expanding the
number of electronic communications outlets available to the
American people. The federal government must do more to
promote cable, UHF, and public television as well as other
means in order to increase the diversity of media access and
public issue debate available to the American people. With
such an abundance of communication opportunity, candidates,
attack victims, and other parties will have little difficulty in find-
ing opportunities to reply to political editorials or personal at-
tacks. Because frequency scarcity will be an outdated rationale,
no need nor justification for burdening licensees with the polit-
ical editorial or personal attack rules will then exist.
In the short run, however, only the personal attack rules
should be eliminated. Maintenance of such response oppor-
tunities is counterproductive and inimical to the public interest.
The FCC can repeal the rules on its own initiative. Congress can,
of course, eliminate them by statute.
Until creation of a communications system of abundance,
there is greater justification for maintaining the political editorial
147 See Taft Broadcasting Co., [1975] 33 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1260. Even when a
candidate is not opposed expressly or the election directly referred to, "a licensee
editorial gives rise to the affirmative obligations of the political editorial rule if it takes a
partisan position on a politically significant issue which is readily and clearly identified
with a legally qualified candidate." Id. at 1268.
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rules. If these rules are to be retained, however, the Commission
should reverse its decision to impose political editorial obliga-
tions whenever a broadcaster editorializes on an issue related to
a campaign because the ruling is difficult to administer, almost
impossible to decipher intelligently, and is especially inhibiting to
licensees. In addition, the parameters for reply obligations in
political editorials should be given further definition.' 48 Both
broadcasters and candidates should know their rights.
' Thus, candidates responding to a licensee's editorial endorsement of an oppo-
nent should be entitled to a similar time period for reply. A 6:00 P.M. licensee editorial
on a Tuesday night should require a reply between 5:00 and 7:00 P.M. on a similar
week night. At the least, a prime-time editorial should require prime-time responses.
Candidates should be offered at least roughly equal total time to reply to licensee
editorials. Further, frequency of broadcast must be given adequate attention. If a
licensee's political editorials are twice as frequent as a candidate's reply, the allocation
formula should be considered inherently suspect; the licensee should be asked to justify
the 2 to 1 frequency ratio with a demonstration that the total time ratio largely offsets
.the frequency differential.
